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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jorge Alberto Lopez-Orozco appeals from his judgment of conviction for three 
counts of first degree murder. Mr. Lopez-Orozco was found guilty at trial and the district 
court imposed three concurrent determinate life sentences. On appeal, Mr. Lopez-
Orozco contends that the district court erred in finding that his brother was an 
unavailable witness and therefore allowing his testimony from the preliminary hearing 
transcript to be read into evidence. Mr. Lopez-Orozco further contends that the district 
court erred in permitting hearsay evidence in the form of an unsworn written statement 
allegedly adopted by his brother to be read into evidence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On August 11, 2002, a burned car was found in a remote area of the desert. 
(Trial Tr., p.1306, L.1 - p.1307, L.3.) Inside the car were three burned bodies, one adult 
and two children. (Trial Tr., p.1415, Ls.7-18, p.1595, Ls.5-12.) The bodies were 
identified as Rebecca Ramirez and her children, Miguel and Ricardo. (Presentence 
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.8.) The vehicle belonged to Mr. Lopez-
Orozco, who had previously dated Ms. Ramirez. (PSI pp.3; 6). Almost nine years later, 
in 2011, Mr. Lopez-Orozco was arrested and charged with the murders. (R., p.21.) 
At the jury trial in this case, the State presented the testimony of Jose Lopez-
Orozco (hereinafter, Jose), Mr. Lopez-Orozco's youngest brother. (Trial Tr., p.2016, L.9 
- p.2074, L.16.) Jose was present at the home of Mr. Lopez-Orozco's sister, Balvina 
Lopez-Orozco (hereinafter, Balvina), in San Jose, California when Mr. Lopez-Orozco 
purportedly discussed events that occurred on the evening of the murder. (Trial 
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Tr., L.7 p.2058, L.8; p.2065, L.1 p.2068, L.23.) At trial, however, 
he did not remember testifying the preliminary hearing, and he did not remember 
making a statement to law enforcement in San Jose in 2002. (Trial Tr., p.2017, L.23 -
p.2018, L.19.) Based on this lack of recall, the State asked that Jose be declared 
unavailable pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(a)(3). (Trial Tr., p.2018, Ls.20-23.) 
Over the objections of defense counsel, the district court found Jose was unavailable 
and permitted the State to read the preliminary hearing testimony of Jose into the 
record. (Trial Tr., p.2019, L.15 - p.2025, L.20.) At the preliminary hearing, evidence 
surrounding the circumstances of an alleged confession and an unsworn statement 
were admitted. (Trial Tr., p.2046, L.17 p.2074, L.16.) The district court then allowed 
the State to read into the record this unsworn statement attributed to Jose. (Trial 
Tr., p.2071, L.7 - p.2074, L.12.) 
This unsworn statement indicates that in early July or August of 2002, Jose's 
brother Simon brought Mr. Lopez-Orozco to the apartment Jose shared with Balvina. 
According to this statement, Mr. Lopez-Orozco seemed sad and desperate, and he told 
Simon and Balvina that he had killed Rebecca and the children and had burned the 
vehicle with them inside. (Trial Tr., p.2072, Ls.12-18.) Further, according to the 
statement, Jose heard Mr. Lopez-Orozco state that he went to Oregon to pick up 
Ms. Ramirez, and 
When he arrived, he noticed some suspIc1ous individuals in the area. 
Becky and her two children left with Jorge to Idaho. The suspicious 
individuals started following them in a truck and fired bullets at them. 
Jorge wasn't hit, and he was able to get rid of the individuals. At some 
point in time, a police car was behind them, but didn't stop them. Becky 
was telling Jorge that she would tell the police that he was keeping her 
against her will. Becky threatened to through one of the children out of the 
window if Jorge didn't stop the car. Jorge didn't stop the car. Jorge 
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reacted to Becky's threats and shot her. Then Jorge took her body to a 
field and burned it inside the vehicle. Jorge didn't mention in detail what 
happened with the children. 
(Trial Tr., p.2072, L.19 - p.2073, L.20.) 
Mr. Lopez-Orozco denied any involvement in the deaths. The parties stipulated 
to the admission of an interview conducted between detectives and Mr. Lopez-Orozco. 
(See State's Exhibit 11.) In the interview, Mr. Lopez-Orozco stated that the allegations 
were not true. (State's Exhibit 11, p.8.) He stated that on the evening at issue, he was 
driving with Ms. Ramirez and the children; she and the children had been sleeping. 
While he was driving, some individuals began shooting at the vehicle. (State's Exhibit 
11, pp.209-12.) Mr. Lopez-Orozco then stopped the vehicle in the middle of the road 
and took off running. (State's Exhibit 11, p.210.) He stated that he did not know 
anything else. (State's. Exhibit 11, p.212.) 
The jury convicted Mr. Lopez-Orozco of three counts of first-degree murder. 
(Trial Tr., p.2857, L.21 - p.2858, L.17; R., pp.642-644.) The district court sentenced 
Mr. Lopez-Orozco to three concurrent determinate life sentences. (3/11/13 Tr., p.2908, 
Ls. 7-15; R., pp.653-655.) Mr. Lopez-Orozco timely appealed. (R., pp.656-659, 668-
675.) The State cross-appealed. (R., pp.664-667.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err in ruling that Jose ,_u,uv,:.. was an unavailable 
witness and then admitting his preliminary hearing testimony? 





The District Court Erred In Ruling That Jose Lopez-Orozco Was "Unavailable" As A 
Witness At Trial And Then Admitting His Preliminary Hearing Testimony 
A. Introduction 
At trial, the State called Jose Lopez-Orozco to testify to a conversation he 
overheard between the defendant and his brother and sister; however, Jose testified 
that he did not recall any such statements. When asked, Jose testified that maybe the 
reason he did not remember the statements made was due to the length of time that 
had passed and because this was an "emotionally charged issue." (Trial Tr., p.201 
Ls.10-18.) The State successfully sought to have Jose declared "unavailable" such that 
his preliminary hearing testimony could be read to the jury. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The determination whether to admit evidence under a hearsay exception is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 567 (2007). The 
standard of review to determine whether the court erred in admitting Jose's preliminary 
hearing testimony is set forth in State v. Ricks, 122 Idaho 856, 863 (Ct. App. 1992), 
where the Idaho Court of Appeals held "we conclude that a case-by-case approach is 
the better way to determine whether the district court was correct in ruling that the 
preliminary hearing testimony was admissible. Where such findings are challenged on 
appeal, we would apply the 'clear error' standard of review." Id. 
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The District Court Erred In Ruling That Jose Lopez-Orozco Was "Unavailable" As 
A Witness At Trial And Then Admitting His Preliminary Hearing Testimony 
1. Availability 
The district court erred when it found Jose was unavailable under Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 804(a)(3). (Tr., p.2023, L.22 - p.2024, L.7.) I.R.E. 804(a)(3) states that: 
"[u]navailability as a witness" includes situations in which the declarant testifies to a lack 
of memory of the subject matter of declarant's statement. I .R. 804(a)(3). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held, "it is not a lack of memory of having made 
the out-of-court statements that is pertinent under I.R. 804(a)(3), but rather lack of 
memory of the 'subject matter' of the out-of-court statements." State v. Fair, 156 Idaho 
431,435 (2014); see also Milburn v. State, 135 Idaho 701, 708 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding 
that I.R.E. 804(a)(3) requires the declarant testify to his lack of memory of the subject 
matter of the out-of-court statements). Further, "[t]he fact that the witness does not 
remember making the statements themselves is irrelevant." Fair, 156 Idaho at 435 
(quoting Lamonica v. Safe Hurricane Shutters, Inc., 711 F.3d 1299, 1317 (11 th Cir. 
2013)). 
In Fair, the witness was asked questions phrased in terms of his recollection 
such that the witness's responses did not show that he lacked memory of the subject 
matter, but merely that he lacked memory of having made the out-of-court statements 
themselves. Id. The Court of Appeals held that the hearsay exception that the 
defendant sought to utilize to admit the statements required unavailability of the 
declarant. Id. Where the defendant failed to show the witness was unavailable, the 
proffered evidence of the witness's out-of-court statements was therefore properly 
excluded. Id. 
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Jose's statements in this case indicate that he merely lacked memory of having 
the out-of-court statements, not that he lacked memory the subject matter. 
Jose testified that he did not recall any statements that Mr. Lopez-Orozco had made in 
his presence regarding his leaving Idaho in 2002: 
Q: Sir, do you recall any statements that the defendant made in your 
presence about his leaving Idaho in 2002? 
A: No. 
Q: Sir, do you recall any statements that you gave to law enforcement 
about what you overheard the defendant say? 
A: No. 
Q: Sir, do you recall the testimony that you provided on June 15, 2011 on 
these very issues? 
A: No. 
Q: And sir, is your lack of recall due to the length of time since 2002, 
when these events occurred? 
A: Maybe. 
Q: It's been a long time for you? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And this has been a very emotionally charged issue for you? 
A: Too emotional. 
Q: All right. 
(Trial Tr., p.2017, L.23 - p.2018, L.19.) Based on Jose's lack of recall when asked 
these three questions, the State requested that he be declared unavailable pursuant to 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(a)(3). (Trial Tr., p.2018, Ls.20-23.) The district court found 
that, based on the testimony offered under oath, the State laid a sufficient factual basis 
from which the district court could determine that Jose lacked memory or recollection of 
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incidents in question 
804(a)(3). (Trial Tr., p.2023, 
was thus an unavailable witness pursuant to I.RE. 
p.2024, L.7.) Over defense counsel's objection, the 
district court declared Jose unavailable and allowed the State to read aloud his 
preliminary hearing testimony. (Trial Tr., p.2019, L.15 - p.2025, L.20.) 
However, Jose's responses do not show that he lacked a memory of the subject 
matter. First, because of the way the prosecutor phrased the questions, Jose's answers 
could indicate that only does Jose not recall any statements, but also that he never 
heard any statements made by the defendant about his leaving Idaho. (Trial 
Tr., p.2017, Ls.23-25.) Second, most of the prosecutor's questions did not inquire about 
Jose's memory of the subject matter of the conversation he overheard; rather, Jose was 
asked if he recalled any statements that he gave to law enforcement about what he 
overheard the defendant say. (Trial Tr., p.2018, Ls.2-4.) Finally, the State asked Jose 
if he recalled the testimony that he provided on June 15, 2011 on these very issues. 
(Trial Tr., p.2018, Ls.6-8.) To each of these questions, Jose responded "No." (Trial 
Tr., p.2018, Ls.1-9.) However, Fair and Milburn require more specific questioning 
before a witness can be declared unavailable. 
The prosecutor's inquiry was insufficient - the pertinent inquiry is lack of memory 
of the subject matter of the out-of-court statement, not a lack of memory of having made 
the out-of-court statements themselves. Fair, 156 Idaho at 435. Thus, "[t]he fact that 
the witness does not remember making the statements themselves is irrelevant." Id. 
(quoting Lamonica v. Safe Hurricane Shutters, Inc., 711 F.3d 1299, 1317 (11 th Cir. 
2013)). 
Here, the prosecutor's inquiry was insufficient to establish that Jose had no 
memory of the subject matter, where he had never previously stated that Mr. Lopez-
8 
Orozco the reason he left Idaho in 2002 was because he killed three people. Thus 
the prosecutor's questions were not designed to elicit an affirmative answer from Jose. 
The State inquired further, but the subsequent question asked of Jose was whether he 
recalled his written statement to law enforcement in 2002, and finally he was asked 
whether he recalled his testimony from the preliminary hearing in 2011. Thus, because 
Jose was never asked whether he remembered overhearing Mr. Lopez-Orozco say that 
he killed Becky and her kids, the State failed to establish that Jose did not recall the 
subject matter which the State sought to introduce at trial. 
The State failed to establish that Jose did not recall overhearing his brother Jorge 
tell Balvina and Simon that he killed Becky and the children. The district court 
erroneously declared Jose unavailable and allowed his preliminary hearing testimony to 
be read to the jury. As this was the only testimony elicited regarding Mr. Lopez-
Orozco's confession to killing Becky and the children, this error surely contributed to 
Mr. Lopez-Orozco's conviction for the charge and, as result, denied his right to a fair 
trial. 
2. Preliminary Hearing 
Three requirements that must be met before the district court may admit into 
evidence the recorded testimony from a preliminary hearing: 
1. [The testimony offered is] [o]ffered as evidence of a material fact and 
that the testimony is more probative on the point for which it is offered 
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through 
reasonable efforts; and 
2. [The testimony offered is] [t]hat the witness is, after diligent and good 
faith attempts to locate, unavailable for the hearing; and 
3. That the preliminary hearing testimony, the party against whom the 
admission of the testimony is sought had an adequate opportunity to 
prepare and cross-examine the proffered testimony. 
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State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 669 (1999) (quoting I.C. § 9-336). "To determine the 
admissibility of preliminary hearing testimony under I. § 9-336, a trial court must make 
factual findings as to the three requirements. Unless clearly erroneous, this Court will 
not disturb those findings." Id. 
Mr. Lopez-Orozco asserts that the district court committed clear error when it 
admitted Jose's testimony from the preliminary hearing because the State failed to 
establish that Jose was unavailable to testify at trial. Pursuant to I.R.E. 804(b)(1 ), 
former testimony can qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule if the declarant is 
unavailable as a witness and "if the party against whom the testimony is now offered ... 
had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross or 
redirect examination." I.R. 804(b)(1 ). Further, Idaho case law has held: 
Under both the statute and rule, the first prerequisite for admission of 
preliminary hearing testimony at a later trial is a showing that the witness 
is unavailable. This unavailability must be established by the proponent of 
the testimony. 
State v. Perry, 144 Idaho 266, 269 (Ct. App. 2007) (internal citations omitted) (holding 
that evidence was insufficient to establish unavailability of witness, therefore, admission 
of witness's preliminary hearing testimony was error); State v. Button, 134 Idaho 864, 
869 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that admitting former testimony of witness who missed his 
airline flight was error as witness was not "unavailable"); Cross, 132 Idaho at 670 
(holding trial court erred in holding out-of-town witness was unavailable and in admitting 
witness's preliminary hearing testimony). 
After Jose testified that he did not remember, the district court ruled that Jose 
was an unavailable witness and that the preliminary hearing transcript should be read to 
the jury as his prior testimony. (Trial Tr., p.2023, L.22 - p.2025, L.20.) The State then 
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read a substantial portion of the testimony to the jury. (Trial Tr., p.2046, L.11 p.2069, 
L.1 ) However, as discussed in Section 1, district court erred in finding was an 
unavailable witness, thus its subsequent decision to allow the preliminary hearing 
transcript to be read into the record was also erroneous as the State had failed to 
establish that the witness was unavailable pursuant to the requirements of I.C. § 9-336 
and I.RE. 804(b)(1 ). 
II. 
The District Court Erred In Permitting Jose's Unsworn Statement To Be Read To The 
.J!Jry 
A. Introduction 
The district court erred when it allowed the unsworn statement attributed to Jose 
to be read to the jury. The unsworn statement was not prepared by Jose, substantial 
time had lapsed between the event and the preparation of the unsworn statement, Jose 
never adopted the unsworn statement, and it did not accurately reflect Jose's 
knowledge in 2002. Thus, the requisite safeguards to insure the probable accuracy of 
the statement were not present and the district court erred in allowing the statement to 
be read to the jury. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court reviews a trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of 
discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51 (2009). 
C. The District Court Erred In Permitting Jose's Unsworn Statement To Be Read To 
The Jury 
Hearsay is a statement offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted. I.RE. 801 (c). There are a number of exceptions to the hearsay rule. One 
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such exception is the past recorded recollection exception. I.R.E. 803(5). This 
exception does not depend on the availability of the witness. I.RE. 803. It provides: 
A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness 
once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the 
witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made or 
adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in memory of the 
witness and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the 
memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be 
received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party. 
I.R.E. 803(5)1; State v. Higgins, 122 Idaho 590,599 (Ct. App. 1992). 
The rationale underlying this rule is to insure the trustworthiness of the writing 
containing the recollection by requiring that the event must have been clearly and 
accurately remembered by the witness at the time of the making of the writing. United 
States v. FMC Corp., 306 F. Supp. 1106, 1137 (E.D. Pa. 1969). This is because the 
information contained therein is not subject to cross examination. Id. 
In order for the statement to qualify as an exception to the hearsay requirements 
under 803(5), it must meet the following qualifications: (1) the witness once had 
knowledge about matters in the document; (2) the witness now has insufficient 
recollection to testify fully and accurately; and (3) the record was made or adopted at a 
1 The corresponding Federal Rule of Evidence, Fed.R.Evid. 803(5), is nearly identical to 
the Idaho Rule, I.R.E. 803(5). Because there are few Idaho cases construing I.R.E. 
803(5), the corresponding federal rule and the decisions of the federal courts when 
discussing and interpreting the federal rule may prove instructive. Further, the Court of 
Appeals has stated, 
Idaho adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence as the Idaho rules in order 
to obtain uniformity in trial practice in Idaho. Chacon v. Sperry Corp., 111 
Idaho 270, 275 (1986). In the absence of a ruling from the Idaho Supreme 
Court to the contrary, we deem it appropriate to follow federal precedent in 
order to maintain, to the extent possible, consistency between the federal 
and Idaho rules. 
State v. Woodbury, 127 Idaho 757, 760, 905 P.2d 1066, 1069 (Ct. App. 1995) 
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time when the matter was fresh in the witness's memory and reflected his knowledge 
correctly. United States v. Schoenborn, 4 F.3d 1424, 1427 (J1h Cir. 1993).2 
There are few Idaho appellate cases addressing the past recollection recorded 
exception to the hearsay rule. In one case, State v. Higgins, 122 Idaho 590, 599-600 
(Ct. App. 1992), the witness testified that she had no independent recollection of her 
testimony at the previous trial. However, she had taken notes at the first trial, she 
testified that she believed her notes to be accurate, and that she had no independent 
recollection of the testimony at the first trial without referring to the notes. Id. 122 Idaho 
at 599. The Idaho Supreme Court noted, in dicta, that pursuant to I.RE. 803(5), had 
the defendant's attorney objected to the reading of the notes, the trial judge would have 
been correct in ruling that the state had laid a sufficient foundation for the admission of 
the notes, and that the witness could have read the notes into the record. Higgins, 1 
Idaho at 600. 
Here, the district court permitted the State to read the unsworn statement to the 
jury as a prior statement exception to the hearsay rules, under I.RE. 803(5). (Trial 
Tr., p.2070, Ls.3-18.) The district court declined to allow the State to admit the unsworn 
statement into evidence as an exhibit, finding that the proponent of the statement was 
not an adverse party, as required by the rule. {Trial Tr., p.2070, Ls.9-16.) The unsworn 
statement was then read into the record. {Trial Tr., p.2071, L.7 - p.2074, L.12.) 
1. Jose Did Not Prepare The Document And Declined To Adopt It 
The first prerequisite to admission is that the witness lacks sufficient present 
recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately. United States v. Senak, 
2 At the time the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided this case, Fed.REvid. 803(5) 
was identical to the current version of I.RE. 803(5). Schoenborn, 4 F.3d 1427, n.2. 
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1 1 (7th Cir. ·J 975). Here, Jose testified that he lacked 
substance of the document and that his recollection was not refreshed reading it. 
(Trial Tr., p.2057, Ls.10-24.) 
However, the unsworn statement read to the jury was a summary of an interview 
conducted in 2002-it was not prepared by Jose, it was never adopted by Jose, and it 
did not accurately reflect his knowledge in 2002. 
"[AJ 'third party's characterization' of a witness's statement does not constitute a 
prior statement of that witness unless the witness has subscribed to that 
characterization." United States v. Almonte, 956 F.2d 27, 29 (2nd Cir. 1992). It is the 
party seeking to introduce the notes who has the burden of proving that such notes 
reflect the witness's own words rather than the note-taker's characterization. Id. 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has set forth the necessary conditions for 
admitting a statement of past recollection recorded by another: 
Where a person perceives an event and reports it to another person who 
records the statement, both must ordinarily testify to establish that the 
statement is a past recollection recorded under Rule 803(5). The person 
who witnessed the event must testify to the accuracy of his oral report to 
the person who recorded the statement. The recorder must also testify to 
the accuracy of his transcription. 
Schoenborn, 4 F.3d at 1427-28 (quoting United States v. Williams, 951 F.2d 853, 858 
(th Cir. 1992)). Further, the Seventh Circuit noted that when the witness and the 
individual who recorded the statement are in disagreement over the accuracy of the 
account, Rule 803(5)'s requirement that the document be made or adopted by the 
witness is not satisfied. Id. at 1428; see also People v. Hoffman, 518 N.W.2d 817, 825 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that denying admission of police officer's typewritten 
notes of witness's statement was proper where witness never adopted statements as 
true and accurate when the matter was fresh in her mind); People v. Kubasiak, 296 
14 
N.W.3d (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that police report of witness's statement 
was inadmissible because witness had not adopted report as accurate when matter was 
fresh in his memory). 
Here, the content of the document, as read aloud to the jury, reflects that this 
was a summary prepared from an interview of Jose on August 16, 2002. This is clear 
from the language used in the unsworn statement, such as: 
[O]n August 16th, 2002 I talked to Detective Enrique Garcia of the San 
Jose police homicide unit. .. When Detective Garcia talked to me, I told 
him that I knew why Detective Garcia wanted to see me. I told Detective 
Garcia that it was because Jorge killed his girlfriend. I told Detective 
Garcia during this interview that in late July or early August of 2002, Jorge 
arrived at the apartment that I shared with my sister Balvina, in San Jose, 
California. The rest of this statement shows what I told Detective Garcia 
about Jorge's visit and what happened during the visit. 
(Trial Tr., p.2071, L 15 - p.2072, L.4.) The unsworn statement was not prepared by 
Jose, as evinced in the trial transcript. (Trial Tr., p.2061, Ls.12-18, p.2059, Ls.4-6.) In 
fact, Jose declined to adopt the statement. He testified that not everything in the 
statement was true. (Trial Tr., p.2053, Ls.1-3.)3 Although presumably Detective Garcia 
prepared the statement based on his notes from his interview with Jose in 2002, this 
third party recorder did not testify at trial regarding his part in preparing the document. 
Thus, the unsworn statement was not prepared by Jose and he never adopted it. 
3 For example, Jose testified that his unsworn statement was not true in 2009: 
Q: At the time you wrote or signed that statement in 2009, was it 
accurate? 
A: What do you mean "accurate"? 
Q: When you signed it was everything in there true? 
A: No. 
(Trial Tr., p.2052, L.23 - p.2053, L.3.) 
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Jose's Unsworn Statement Was Not Prepared While The Matter Was 
Fresh In His Mind 
Alternatively, should this Court find that Jose did testify at the preliminary hearing 
that the unsworn statement accurately reflected his knowledge in 2009, this is still 
insufficient to satisfy the rule as the unsworn statement would not have been adopted 
by the witness until seven years after the matter at issue, as discussed, infra. This fact, 
coupled with the fact that Jose claimed that information was added to the unsworn 
statement after he signed it, eviscerated the trustworthiness of the writing. Thus the 
unsworn statement should not have been read aloud to the jury, over defense counsel's 
objections. 
Jose's unsworn statement was prepared more than seven years after the event 
at issue. Pursuant to I.R. 803(5), the document must have been prepared while the 
matter was fresh in the memory of the witness. Idaho appellate courts have not yet 
specifically addressed the freshness requirement, however, when interpreting the 
corresponding federal rule of evidence the federal courts have declined to impose a 
specific time constraint on the freshness requirement. See Senak, 527 F .2d at 141 ; see 
also United States v. Lewis, 954 F.2d 1386, 1393 (J1h Cir. 1992) (holding that Fed.R.Evi. 
803(5) "does not have specific time constraints on the timing of the preparation and 
adoption of memoranda."). As the Seventh Circuit found in Senak: 
[W]e believe the better view is that the discretion of the trial judge should 
not be rigidly bound by an inflexible rule but rather that it should be 
exercised on a case-by-case basis giving consideration to all pertinent 
aspects including the lapse of time which reasonably and properly bear 
upon the likelihood of the statement being an accurate recordation of the 
event to which the memory related. 
Senak, 527 F.2d at 141 (holding that a statement made three years after the event was 
admissible but recognizing the existence of cases in which a much lesser period of time 
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was held to be fatal to admissibility); United States v. Patterson, F.2d 774, 779 (9th 
Cir. 1982) (holding a ten month delay between the event and the statement was a close 
question, but that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the record); but 
c.f. United States v. FMC Corp., 306 F.Supp. 1106, 1137-38 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (holding 
that proffered grand jury testimony taken five to six years prior was too remote in time 
particularly in light of the memory lapses of the witness both at trial and when the grand 
jury testimony was taken); United States v. Schwartz, 390 F.2d 1 (3rd Cir. 1968) 
(holding several factors detracted from the probable reliability of the statement including 
that the statement was not given under oath and was made over seven years after the 
events described therein). The federal approach to whether a writing qualifies as a prior 
recorded recollection is to consider all of the factors "which reasonably and properly 
bear upon the likelihood of the statement being an accurate recordation of the event" on 
a case-by-case basis. Senak, 527 F .2d at 141. However, as aptly noted by the Utah 
Court of Appeals, although the lapse of time is typically just one of many circumstances 
bearing on the rule's freshness requirement: 
[W]here the lapse of time between the event and the actual recordation of 
the event in a memorandum or record is so substantial that it contradicts 
the very meaning of the term "fresh," that significant lapse of time weighs 
all but conclusively against a finding of freshness, absent other 
circumstances vouching for the recordation's freshness, accuracy, and 
trustworthiness. 
TWN, Inc. v. Michel, 131 P.3d 882, 888 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the trial court 
erred in allowing an affidavit prepared fourteen years after the event to be read into the 
record). 
In this case, the document was not signed by Jose until 2009, which suggests 
that Detective Garcia (or someone in his office) transcribed what had been discussed in 
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interview with Jose and prepared the resulting unsworn statement describing 
the topics of an interview that occurred seven years ago. 
Further, Jose was asked about the lapse of time between when he spoke to the 
detectives and when he signed the statement: 
Q: Mr. Lopez, would it be true that the statement that you have in front of 
you was written two years ago? 
A: Two years ago? No. 
Q: When was the statement written? 
A: It says 2002. 
Q: Look at the last page where you signed it. You signed this statement 
in 2009, correct? 
A: It seems like it. 
Q: Okay. At the time that you signed this statement, did it truthfully say 
what you remember? 
A: Yes. I couldn't really remember much. 
Q: Okay. Does this statement set forth what you remembered in 2009? 
A: That's part of the statement that I gave in 2002 that's in the front of it. 
Q: Right. You provided a statement in 2002, correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And what you were told was put in this document in 2009, correct? 
A: Seems that way. 
Q: So when you signed this in 2009, was it true? 
A: That's what I said before. 




everything you remembered in 2009? 
A: No. 
(Trial Tr., p.2058, L.9 - p.2059, L.1 ) 
Based upon the content of the unsworn statement, is apparent that the unsworn 
statement was prepared more than seven years after the incident Jose struggled to 
recall. Although the unsworn statement was likely created based on Detective Garcia's 
notes from his interrogation of Jose back in 2002, it does not appear that the document 
was actually prepared until 2009-seven years after Jose spoke to Detective Garcia. 
(Trial Tr., p.2059, Ls.1-6.)4 The alleged conversation between Mr. Lopez-Orozco and 
his siblings was overheard in August of 2002, but Jose did not initial the unsworn 
statement until 2009. (Trial Tr., p.13, L.10 - p.2053, L.3, p.2058, L.9 - p.2059, L.6.) 
Although courts have held that there is no specific time requirement in order to find the 
document was created contemporaneously, the seven year time gap negates the 
extrinsic safeguards of trustworthiness upon which the rule is based. 
3. The Unsworn Statement Attributed To Jose Does Not Satisfy The 
Requirements Of The Evidentiary Rule As It Does Not Accurately Reflect 
His Knowledge 
The unsworn statement was not adopted by Jose in 2009 and does not 
accurately reflect his memory of events that occurred in 2002. Further, Jose testified 
that he never signed it under oath-that information was added after he signed it. 
4 The prosecutor intimated the time sequence in her questions as follows: 
Q: Right. You provided a statement in 2002, correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And what you were told was put in this document in 2009, correct? 
A: Seems that way. 
(Trial Tr., p.2059, Ls.1-6.) 
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further called the accu of the document into question when he claimed 
that information was added to the statement after he signed it: 
A: I never said "I swear." I never said "I swear this is the truth." They 
wrote that after I signed it. 
Q: So you are saying that you signed it, and then they added the language 
about this being under 
A: Yes. Yes. 
Q: And who did that? 
A: The detectives. 
(Trial Tr., p.2053, Ls.10-18.) Additionally, Jose could not even recall the information 
contained in his unsworn statement: 
Q: Did Jorge tell Balvina what happened to Becky? 
A: No. No. I don't remember. No. 
Q: Do you remember what Jorge said happened to Becky? 
A: No. 
Q: So if I understand correctly, you don't remember Jorge saying that he 
shot Becky? 
A: No. 
(Trial Tr., p.2057, Ls.5-7, p.2057, L.22 - p.2058, L.2.) Jose was confused when asked 
about the unsworn statement and did not know when the statement was written, but 
then seemed to agree that the statement was true when it was written, seven years 
after the interview. (Trial Tr., p.2058, L.9 - p.2059, L.15.) Where Jose repeatedly 
testified that he did not know, that he did not remember, or responded "no" when asked 
about the substance of the conversations at issue, it is clear he did not adopt the 
unsworn statement. Thus it is clear that the unsworn statement does not correctly 
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reflect Jose's knowledge of the conversation he overheard between Mr. Lopez-Orozco 
and his sister and the district court erred in allowing the unsworn statement to be read 
to the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Lopez-Orozco requests that his convictions be vacated and the case 
remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this 5th day of August, 2014. 
SALLY OOLEY 
Deputy State Appellate Pl:IMlic Defender 
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